Demanding electoral system reform is merely the exercise of people's rights
log date: 2026-4-14
rewrote: 2026-6-1
Opening with a brief explanation of how South Korea's democratic system has rapidly collapsed along with its corrupt electoral system; it was revealed through a significant amount of evidence that the National Election Commission (hereinafter NEC), the institution responsible for conducting fair and transparent elections, has instead been committing fraud.
While this is undoubtedly a shocking fact, public awareness has been surprisingly slow despite the disclosure of sufficient evidence.
When we first began to pay a close attention in South Korea's corrupt electoral system, one thing was clear: a pervasive social atmosphere where people turned a blind eye to the NEC's brazen fraud and fail to even recognize that such actions were wrong.
According to those who conducted the investigation, it was revealed that high-ranking public officials condoned and protected the NEC despite being aware of its misconduct.
It is presumed that lawmakers who were barely elected thanks to the NEC's fraud have protected the NEC throughout their terms by concealing or destroying relevant evidence and silencing witnesses.
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| Clearly distinguishable fake ballots (red basket, left) and real ballots (blue basket, bottom right.) |
If there had been a media outlet monitoring power in South Korea, corruption and crimes involved with high-ranking public officials could not have persisted for decades.
This was possible only because, as is well known in many countries, there is no journalism in South Korea that committed to monitor high-ranking public officials.
Although there are a few journalists trying to fulfill their duties, their influence is minimal. The reality is that if one exposes corruption and misconduct of the ruling power, they face retaliation, become a scapegoat, are forced to flatter the regime, and ultimately end up becoming its spokesperson.
Hundreds of fake news media or pseudo-media outlets select news to mislead the public while they receive subsidies and advertisements provided by the ruling power. MBC, Joongang, Chosun, Dong-a, SBS, and JTBC are cited as the most harmful media outlets that have served as spokespersons for political power and legal cartel for decades. These are referred to
as media controlled by the vested interests, being hotbeds of fake news.
Believe or not, the media outlets listed above have been major media organizations in South Korea, that have pledged allegiance to Japan and committed acts of treason against the state since the Japanese colonial period. South Koreans classify them as media outlets whose very foundation is treason.
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Read more about the election fraud in South Korea : |
For a long time, brave and righteous whistleblowers have been exposing misconduct by the NEC and allegations of collusion among Supreme Court Justice. However, it is presumed that the NEC's misconduct was thoroughly concealed by state power while only a very small number of people secretly shared the information.
Nonetheless, this issue began to become widely known to the public when lawmakers who were seeking re-election realized they were defeated due to election fraud and protested in anger.
They brought this issue to public attention through movies, books, and YouTube channels. Yet, the movie was pulled from theaters just days after its release, books were removed from shelves, and YouTube channels were excluded from search engine optimization (SEO) algorithms.
Voters and candidates who learned of the NEC's misconduct raised objections and demanded recounts.
However, judges handling recount cases, such as Tae-ahc Noh and Dae-yeob Cheon, dismissed most of the hundreds of recount requests. Thus, actual recounts were conducted in only a very small number of cases.
The recently released evidence against the NEC's midconduct consists of photos and video footage taken and collected by citizens including lawyers who observed the recount process.
Many citizens witnessed and reported irregularities at local NEC offices, early voting stations, and mail-in ballot storage facilities. However, there are testimonies that numerous witnesses who tried to expose these facts went missing, and that some died after being harassed for years by police surveillance, lawsuits, and criminal charges.
It is known that election fraud by the NEC Korea began during the Kim Daejung (15th) administration. Although its misconduct likely commenced during the 16th President Election and the 17th General Election, its impact appears to have been minimal due to no early voting system.
Therefore, it is believed that the 17th administration introduced the early voting system as a method to steer election results in a more favorable direction. According to analysis, from that point on, election results in South Korea began to be swayed by specific individuals.
It is said that until the 17th administration ruined the national electoral system, South Korea's election system was structured in accordance with democratic principles, making it difficult for fraud to infiltrate. It is considered that a relatively fair electoral system was maintained until the term of the 14th President Kim Young-sam.
However, since the early voting system was introduced under the 17th administration, corruption has intensified as election law provisions were amended to facilitate fraud related to the NEC. As a result, analyses suggest that state power is no longer formed by the votes of the electorate. As of 2026, South Korea's electoral system has reached a preposterous level that it is embarrassing to even mention it.
It appears that Korean society lacks appropriate institutions for voters to report irregularities witnessed during the election period, and law enforcement agencies to punish such acts are also inadequate.
Furthermore, it has been revealed that judges specializing in election-related litigation, such as Dae-yeob Cheon and Tae-ahc Noh, have been shielding the NEC which has been committed blatant misconduct.
According to testimonies from those involved in recount lawsuits, these specific judges exclusively handled recount cases, dragging out the proceedings as long as possible before dismissing most cases to cover up the systemical scheme.
In reality, cases that actually proceeded to a recount were extremely rare, and reports are emerging that misconduct continued even when judges, candidates, and observers were present at the scene.
Although bundles of counterfeit ballots that were impossible to identify as genuine were discovered in stored ballot boxes at the recount site, the judges reportedly closed the cases, stating that there were "insufficient grounds to consider it fraud."
The screenshots attached in this synopsis are evidence of fraud witnessed at the recount site, the counting station, and on election day, shared in public through various SNS platforms.
Since ballot papers are printed and distributed one by one by machine at local NEC offices, any traces of mass printing in bundles found in ballot boxes are the result of fraud.
It is said that ballot papers pass through electronic counters at least twice before being sealed at the counting station. Because they pass through sequentially one by one, it appears to be impossible to find bundled ballot papers at the recount site as shown in the photos below.
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| Bundles of ballots showing traces of mass printing, which are not seen at early voting polling stations where ballots are printed individually, were discovered at the recount site. Photo provided by an SNS user. |
We began writing about this subject with the hope that South Korean voters can reform their electoral system as soon as possible, that future elections can be held through transparent and fair procedures, and ultimately that qualified and decent politicians can lead the country.
Notwithstanding, no matter how hard people outside of Korea try, it will be difficult to rectify the corrupt electoral system unless South Korean voters step forward to demand reform.
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| Two marked ballots were found stuck together at the top of each other at the recount site. During the election period, there is no occasion for the glue, which is typically seen on bundles of freshly printed paper, to get on the ballot papers or the top of the ballots. |
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An engineer more committed to a public-spirited mindset than any high-ranking public official in South Korea
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| The most significant and fatal point among the contents Jahng analyzed. It reveals that the NEC Korea has been violating regulations regarding secret ballots and personal information protection. It is also possible to estimate that information on the voting tendencies of voters has already been collected and may be being used in opinion polls. |
A South Korean engineer on a YouTube channel revealed that he proved the hypothesis that there was fraud in several past elections and that re-election should have been held after the results were invalidated.
He emphasized that the integrity of elections is a non-negotiable fundamental condition in a democratic system. If one single vote indicates that fraudulent activities were involved, the election is deemed rigged and re-election procedures are to be initiated.
The Ban-gu-dae Petroglyphs in Daegog-ri, Ulju (National Treasure No.285) are prehistoric drawings created by people of the Neolithic to Bronze Ages, who carved animals such as whales, tigers, and deer onto the rock face of Daegogcheon Stream in Ulsan. It is a global cultural heritage that showcases the lifestyle, beliefs, and human creativity of the time, including the world's oldest depiction of whale hunting.
This engineer, who majored in chemical engineering, invested his life, technical skills, brilliant mind, and personal funds to analyze how fraud was committed in South Korean elections, and he released his findings to the world in a way that yielded no compensation or profit.
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| There are six distinct differences between early voting ballots and election day ballots that are recognizable at a glance even from a distance; therefore, the National Election Commission Korea's explanation that these two different types of ballots were mixed up during the sorting and counting process cannot be accepted as fact. |
Watching all three video materials of his analysis report, I realized just how long he must have struggled to get an answer form the Korean National Election Commission (NEC).
I have witnessed countless times how the NEC Korea, even when summoned for parliamentary investigations or hearings, not only failed to admit fraud with intentional mismanagement but instead drained the energy of questioners with irrelevant answers and evasive wordplay. Therefore, I could fully imagine the hardship Jahng must have endured in obtaining information from the NEC and admire his persistent efforts.
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| It explains the vote counting procedures and shows who makes up the vote counting staff. |
The analysis of the facts Jahng uncovered and the data obtained through information disclosure was shocking.
Only a very small portion is presented here.
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| The procedures for receiving ballots from early voting stations at the post office. |
As shown in the procedural diagram illustrating the movement of early voting ballot boxes above, these ballot boxes which travel through multiple locations before arriving at the counting station, are placed in a state where neither election observers nor even voters can monitor them.
Not only are the ballot boxes completely unmonitored, but they are also exposed to danger during inter-city transport without legitimate reason. This means that even if someone were to open a ballot box, insert fake ballots, and close it again, no one would be able to detect it.
There were also reports that postal workers and voters have repeatedly blew the whistle regarding the mishandling of ballot boxes, but all of their complaints were ignored.
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| The most significant and fatal point among the contents Jahng analyzed. It reveals that the NEC Korea has been violating regulations regarding secret ballots and personal information protection. It is also possible to estimate that information on the voting tendencies of voters has already been collected and may be being used in opinion polls. |
The provision guaranteeing that one cannot reveal who they voted for is the 'secret ballot,' one of the four fundamental principles of democratic elections. In the case of the Republic of Korea, pursuant to Article 167 (Guarantee of Voting Secrecy) of the Public Official Election Act, electors are not obligated to disclose to anyone the candidate or political party they voted for, and the secrecy of the vote is legally guaranteed.
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| Fatal flaws in the currently implemented out-of-district early voting management system as of March 2026. |
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| The election is being held while fully exposed to the risk of hacking due to the wireless communication capabilities of the laptops connected to the early voting ballot issuing machines. |
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| The warning (pointed by a red arrow) label on the laptop connected to the early voting ballot issuing machine states, "There is a possibility of radio interference with the wireless equipment during operation." |
It is impossible to introduce all the information shared by Engineer Jahng here. He reorganized the analysis into about 200 slides and also produced three videos to support his analysis. Since including his explanations verbatim would make this text excessively long, I am sharing only the video links.
Please watch these videos and share them with voters who are unaware of the loopholes in the Korean election system and the ease with which election results can be manipulated.
Jahng stated that although he published a book based on his analysis report last year, he produced three videos to help more voters easily understand their nation's election system.
He urges young people to use the results of his research and analysis to fight against the shameful electoral system, demand institutional reform from local politicians, and build a Republic of Korea where true democracy is realized.
Jahng began proving election fraud out of desire for Korean society to become fairer and more transparent. Driven by a sense of responsibility that he could not pass down the electoral system - the foundation of democracy - to future generations in its current corrupt state, he requested the NEC to disclose information and strove to reveal the truth, bearing fees of millions of won per request.
We extend our deep gratitude and applause to Engineer Jahng for his courage, dedication, brilliance, and perseverance, as well as for the research achievements he accomplished by staking his conscience as an engineer.
As the CEO of a small to medium-sized enterprise, he likely did not have much spare time. The reason he carved out time - which should have been entirely dedicated to his own business - to analyze NEC's responses and strive to prove whether any misconduct had occurred was solely out of concern for the future of the nation and its people.
Due to the weight of responsibility, many corporate leaders find it difficult to even spare time for their own hobbies. Nevertheless, this outstanding engineer who has dedicated himself to the public good is Young-hoo Jahng (장영후).
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| Engineer Young-hoo Jahng (장영후) on the right. |
We also hope that Mr. Jahng, who dreams of living a peaceful life farming in a quiet countryside after his retirement, will fulfill his cherished dream in the end. Notwithstanding, as he is still too young to retire, we ask that he pass on his skills and experience to as many junior engineering students and young people as possible before he retires.
Who is Engineer Young-hoo Jahng?
Young-hoo Jahng a chemical engineer who has experienced as a commissioning engineer in the oil refining, petrochemical, and polymer industries. He possesses a foundation of technical expertise built over more than 20 years, starting in the mid-1990s in a field that was virtually non-existent in information systems, and has exceptional data analysis capabilities accumulated during the commercialization of applications.
Jahng manages his own company that provides Operation and Manufacturing Solutions utilizing design and IT technologies. His management goals, which can be found on the website of his company, Ban-gu O&M Solutions, are as follows:
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| "Ban-gu O&M Solutions was born in Ulsan and will grow into a national treasure-level entity, just like the Ban-gu-dae Petroglyphs, contributing to the safe operation and smart environment construction for our plant industry customers." |
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